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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
Court follow the New Hampshire decision? In the Securo case
the West Virginia Court said:
"But whether the rule should be carried to the extent, as
some of the cases have done, of denying the infant a right to
maintain an action for damages against his parent for injury
inflicted with evil intention and from wicked motives is a
question not now before us but remains for consideration if
such unfortunate situation should arise."
-JEROME KATZ.
REAL PROPERTY-USE OF "DESCEND" IN DEED-WORD OF
LIMITATION.-On February 19, 1868, Matthew L. Ward and wife
conveyed a certain tract of land to "Lewis Woolwine (for the use
and benefit of Columbia, his wife and upon her decease to descend
to her heirs)." Columbia Woolwine thereafter conveyed parcels
of the land in fee simple, and, through mesne conveyances, those
lands come to A. S. Bosworth and Nellie A. Maxwell, among others.
In November, 1928, Columbia Woolvine died and thereafter her
heirs brought a bill for partition, claiming that they had a fee
simple interest as remainder-men. Held: The deed from Matthew
L. Ward and wife to Lewis Woolwine operated to vest in Columbia
Woolwine an equitable fee simple estate, and the heirs took
nothing as remaindermen. Trahtern v. Woolwine.1
It would seem that the phrase "to Lewis Woolwine for the
use and benefit of Columbia, his wife" gave Columbia Woolwine
an equitable fee simple,2 unless the words following were intended
to limit or qualify such an interest: "and upon her decease to
descend to her heirs." The Court said that the latter phrase did
not limit or qualify the fee, but was merely descriptive of the fee,
i. e., an estate which would descend to the heirs of Columbia Wool-
wine at her decease. That construction rests upon the theory that
the grantor used the word "descend" in its technical sense, as
meaning "to pass by succession." It is doubtful, however, that the
word was not used in its technical sense, for there are apparently
other and better words to show an intent to pass a fee, and least of
all would one expect a conveyancer to express such an intent i
such an awkward way. Of course, if "descend" was used tech-
nically, Columbia Woolwine took a fee simple and her heirs took
nothing.
1155 S. E. 909 (W. Va. 1930).
2 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 11; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes,
1923) c. 71, § 8
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In view of these considerations it would seem that "descend"
was used in its popular sense, as "to go" or "to pass." Under
such a construction of the deed, our statute abolishing the Rule in
Shelley's Case would apparently limit Columbia Woolwine's estate
to an equitable life estate and give her heirs a contingent remainder
in fee simple. Thus construed the case would seem to be governed
by Carter v. Reserve Gas Company' yet a contrary result was
reached.
The plaintiffs were trying to recover an estate which had in-
creased in value from $1,400 in 1868, to near $5,000,000 in 1930,
and the defendants were trying to sustain titles to 152 acres of
land which had been divided into city lots, streets and alleys, and
comprised about one-third of the real estate in the City of Elkins.
The decision of the Court, sustaining the contentions of the de-
fendants, saved that great catastrophe to the City of Elkins, but
denied to the Woolwine heirs an estate which, it would seem, vested
in them on the death of Columbia Woolwine. The decision per-
mitted a life tenant to destroy what may have been intended as a
contingent remainder. It may be better to deny the titles of the
Woolwine heirs than to precipitate upon the City of Elkins the
probable result of upsetting one-third of the land titles in that
city6
-WmLIA- J. MOORE.
TAXATION-TRUSTS-INTEREST OF ONE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE
INCOME FOR LIFE FRom TRUST FUND.-A citizen, of Virginia con-
veyed certain securities to a trustee in Maryland to pay the income
to the settlor's children for life and after their death to divide the
property among the settlor's descendants.1 The taxing authorities
of Virginia attempted to tax the interest of one of the children, a
resident of Virginia, claiming she had an equitable life estate in the
fund and taxable under the provision of the intangible property
tax statute imposing taxation on bonds, notes and all other de-
8W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) e. 36, art. 1, § 14; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes,
1923, e. 71, § 11.
'Carter v. Reserve Gas Co., 84 W. Va. 741, 100 S. E. 738 (1919).
5 See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908) 8 COL. L. REV. 605; Hard-
man, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 163.
' Commonwealth v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 155 S. E. 895 (1930).
2 TA X CODE OF VIRGINIA (1930) e. 7, § 69.
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